Recent and fundamental context

Birth and consolidation

Duro Felguera is one of the oldest companies in Spain. It started in 1857 as a steel company and would start production in 1860. Until 100 years ago it would not start exporting to other countries.

Duro Felguera would survive the post-war crisis thanks to an autoarchic program that was what it was in Franco's time. He would invest all his efforts in creating his own machines and workshops, as well as materials coming from the mines and tools for the shipyard and the factories.

After 20 years of swelling its own resources, it would be dedicated to selling and exporting to other companies in the national market. From 1965, it would increase its international line and cease to be a purely manufacturing company of raw materials. In this case of the main materials of the Asturian mining basins. The opening to the outside of Duro would be progressive and come to contribute more than 95% of the total contracts in 2010. On that road would suffer several crises as in 1992, when the first Gulf War.

From that period on, it would have a very strong national presence and would increasingly be present in other countries. Its main competitor at the national level would be the Basque company Babcock-Wilcox. This company allegedly would be receiving special treatment by the socialist governments of the 80s and still would not be as strong as Duro Felguera. Even giving these supports would not survive two decades later. Hard though it would hold the pull.

The diversification of Duro Felguera at the end of the 80s would be quite large but even so it would not be able to generate a large EBDITA. The Central Hispano bank, which was the largest shareholder at that time, would decide to get rid of its position in the company after the last crisis of the government of Felipe Gonzalez, an international crisis that coincided with the first Gulf War.

From the arrival of the German partner, Metallgesellchaft Duro would change dynamics, from being a manufacturer of materials or tools to being the one that would be responsible for delivering the projects "turnkey" . This would be part of the evolution of many companies in Europe, which seeing that other countries in the world manufactured more and cheaper would devote all their effort to manage projects and finalize them.

Duro had a lot of experience from below and that would give him a great strength against other competitors who had always been dedicated to managing projects and selling them, but who always depended on "how" and "what". This experience would be the result of the development of structures and machinery to carry out plants and factories in Spain for more than half a century. Thanks to this, it would soon expand to other countries having a presence where they are shown on the following map:

Internationalization and growth

In 2000 the shareholders would change again, making other local investor groups and Álvarez Arrojo increase its capital in the company significantly.

In 2009, after the huge economic crisis in Spain, due to the drop in domestic demand, it would be forced to focus on other countries. Thanks to the internationalization of the business two decades ago, it would be able to survive the crisis. Ángel Antonio del Valle , son-in-law of the majority shareholder, Juan Carlos Torres, owner of the gijón group Álvarez Arrojo, would be named president in 2011.

In 2013 due to the good performance of the group it would be possible to increase dividends to the shareholder, reaching almost 8%, being among the best of the Spanish stock market. This moment would be the one in which the big banks led by Santander would arrive at Duro with the intention of financing new projects at an international level . In the same year, a takeover bid would be approved for a high percentage of shares, maintaining power in the group's historical shareholders.
These are shown below:



In this way, Duro Felguera would be a safe bet for the next few years, seeing the graph of its behavior on the stock market during 2013:



In it you see an impeccable bullish guidance that would soon clash with the harsh reality of the accounts ...
Duro Felguera, who had a good relationship with the Santander bank, began to have great difficulties due to deviations and mismanagement in their contracts, with many extra costs and problems, especially in South America. As if that were not enough by the end of the year, Duro would lose one of the biggest contracts that it had valued at almost 1000 million for a mining project in Australia due to the financial problems of one of its partners. This would impact fully in 2015. The other big problem would be the extra costs in projects such as the Argentine plant which would reach 50 million euros.

Problems begin

En 2015 Andres Giraldo Andres Giraldo would leave the group seeing what was to come. This manager would be responsible and much of everything that happened in the last three years. It would be from the Santander bank where the evolution of the company would have been completely controlled .

Due to the high diversification the risk of the company was already very subject to the economic situation in South America or in other countries. In Brazil in 2015 there would be an unprecedented crisis with a high devaluation of the Brazilian Real. In addition, other countries like Venezuela were starting to have problems.

And it is that that year was spent in three months one third of the total value of the company and the benefits in the first four-month period would decrease by 50% compared to the previous year. This usually happens when a company arrives at bad managers and they try to make the maximum profit in the shortest possible time , asking for loans to carry out projects or embarking to spend thinking about benefits of projects that still They are not starting. And this is what the famous Giraldo would have done in his previous years and his team, squander 100 years of a company's signature . Responsible would be the president of having appointed him, and of not having had enough caution as his father-in-law, the creator of the great Duro Felguera. And is that the succession of the same by his son-in-law would have been the last of the options he would have had but due to his state of health in recent times and want to leave the company in the hands of the family would have been finally like this.

The chart on the right shows the evolution of the debt compared with the cash of the company, seeing how in 2015 they are already at the same level, starting to enter a dangerous area. So, the worst was yet to come and due to leaving vultures in the nest, the Santander bank would become one of the main creditors of this group. Having full power to manage the company at will. It would also have all the internal information of the group to be able to make and unpack if necessary . In 2016, despite having orders for a value greater than 2000 million debt would begin to corral Duro Felguera and banks would try to restructure that debt to be able to be paid in the future. Those involved in these adjustments would be the majority of the Spanish banking sector: Banco Santander, BBVA, CaixaBank, Popular, Banco Sabadell, Liberbank and Banco Cooperativo .

In 2017 the crisis would explode, and is that the strong debt of the company would be added problems such as a complaint for the collection of bribes to countries like Venezuela in 2009 to take contracts. These facts of the past were unmasked just when the company had more problems surely for someone who had been harmed by Duro or for interests in which the quote fell further. Already exceeding 50% of losses that year and according to the graph does not present a very forward future. And is that since 2012 the financial situation of the company would have gone downhill, being 2015 the critical year where everything would change coincident with the departure of Andres Giraldo.

Seen like this already in 2017 it would be seen that the banks wanted to save their furniture, forcing the company to bankruptcy to recover their loans to a certain extent. However, there is still the question of whether those banks would not be responsible for having left credits knowing that they were not going to be paid in order to be able to stay in the future, and that the banks have transferred withdrawals to the bank but in exchange they have received more control over the company. The purpose is to lose as little money as possible by recovering part of the loans with the works that remain to be completed, and that is where most of the money that is refinanced goes. With this the banks recover their money and also gain a position within the company which will be controlled in the future by funds and companies controlled by these banks.

Recent and fundamental context

This 2018 will have been one of the darkest chapters in the history of Duro Felguera. Since the highs of 2011 the capitalization of the company has gone from being worth more than 500 million to be worth about 50 million. One tenth of what it was worth, going from 6 euros to just over 50 cents.

The fat fall would occur in 2015, retreating 75% of its value. From that fall back another 50%, to reach the 0.92 euros that marked the previous graph, and hence a return to minimums. Currently it is trading at 1.2 cents per share. Seen with perspective of the old value to about 12 centimos of euro of the old shareholders. This means another dilution of almost 90%. In this way, any shareholder who had € 70,000 in this value only three years ago would not have more than € 1,000 left today. This bulky loss has not been supervised by stock regulators or by any external auditor. It is not surprising that every day more foreign funds avoid investing in Spanish listed companies and the IBEX35 is on its way to the abyss.

In any other European country this would have been cut long before it happened. After the announcement of the expansion, Banco Santander would lead the restructuring agreement, trying to fit the largest number of shares to the retailers. In this case the play would not go well and although one day came to rise almost 200% passing the shares of 6 cents to 20 cents on the day would be neither more nor less than intraday retailers and the bank itself that had to stop that speculative move because there were not nearly people who went to that extension. The majority of investors had the memory of Abengoa, where the bank threw the stone and hid the hand, starting as the company's supporter and undoing its positions along with the rest of the banks, selling the shares that had been granted to them at the best price. , and remaining enough to have the company controlled.

In this case most of the shares are from the banks and they have not gotten anyone to give a hard for them, being the value in technical bankruptcy and being at the expense of the completion of projects to be liquidated the company. When the time comes, the creditors' meeting will be presented and their assets will be granted to the banks at the best of times. All this capital increase and restructuring of the debt has been possible thanks to the two large historic families of the shareholders of Duro Felguera such as Inversiones Somio, with 27%, (Arrojo family) and Inversiones Rio Magdalena, 11% (Arias family), they have not attended the extension as a condition of the banks . And it is that like in Abengoa with the Benjumea, the banks take justice into their own hands and in the end if you do not pay what you owe they take you out of the way.

One more proof of how swollen the capitalization of the company was before the expansion is explained by the rise to 23 cents of the company that after the expansion could reach almost 1,500 million. This was a mere stratagem by banks to try to strip any retailer. A practice that should have been investigated by the CNMV. Just before the widening, the stock would fall to lows again, going from 23 cents to 2 cents. And is that giving a company the value for the shares when there was 97% of new shares that were in the form of law is a practice where the word speculation falls short and where other words such as fraud or theft come in .

But the worst was yet to come because after this new injection of capital the company would present disastrous results, presenting losses of more than 50 million in a single quarter. Recall that the company was worth no more than 50 million before the disaster. Due to the new measure of the CNMV favored by the BME the minimum would be considered below the cent per share.

As soon as the measure was taken, the stock would suffer a new collapse, reaching 0.7 cents or, in other words, 0.007 €. A capitalization of 30 million euros. After leaving the quotation in these prices in which nobody dares to justify its value since knowing that it is in technical bankruptcy and that the value is negative, I ask myself the following questions.

• Who decides how much he needs to be?
• A value in technical bankruptcy should not be suspended and out of quotation.
• How in just two years the Spanish stock market seems more like a casino starting with values ​​as such (Codere) than a reflection of the value of Spanish companies?
• Who has allowed this to happen?
• Why this government or the previous one has not done anything?
• Why do not any communication media starting with those who like to investigate everything like La Sexta have not addressed these issues?

All this said and added to other analysts this action, if you can give this name, can not sustain and anyone who comes from old prices should file a complaint or complaint and get in touch with a good lawyer . Here you should not invest any centimo gentlemen, because this is not investment, this is casino and should be listed as such. The banks that allow the purchase and sale of these securities are responsible also for the losses that may be reported being in my opinion as with the junk mortgages, accomplices of the loss of capital of their customers and should pay for it.

Technical analysis

If we analyze the value in the long-term plane we observe how there are three great moments.

• A moment of progressive rise that begins in 2004 and coincides with the rise that took the IBEX35 to its historical maximum of 15,000 points.
• A great correction after the impact of the banking crisis and housing in 2008 that would bring the value to fall 50% of the previous increase, and after it exceed the previous maximum.
• A sharp drop in the price after knowing the full financial situation that although it was already known since 2014 would be uncovered already in 2015, with enough time for banks to do and undo at will. From this fall the technical bankruptcy of the value would arrive although it would not be reflected in its quotation.

From there the banks would play with the value trying to make an Abengoa in Duro Felguera without having much success. And is that the price prior to the increase would rise from 0.02 € to 0.23 € representing a quotation equivalent to 1,500 million. In Abengoa the same thing happened and the CNMV did not take letters, but nobody would expect that 1 year later the same thing would happen. However, Abengoa would be worth virtually that value after dilution but we are talking about a company with dimensions 20 times greater than Duro Felguera is so it could have some meaning. In this case the only possible reasoning is that the banks currently have control of the CNMV . The regulatory body does what they want it to do.

From the following graph you can draw the following conclusion. The price of Duro Felguera should have been suspended in December 2015 and not have reopened until right now with the loss of the value of the stock to the former owners and leaving time for possible claims for negligence.

Si nos vamos al gráfico de corto plazo observamos como tras la operación interesada del cambio de mínimo de cotización el valor ha sufrido varios vaivenes, con unos porcentajes más tipicos de un casino que de una institución bursátil con variaciones de más del 50% en apenas un dia que no reflejan para nada ni la cotización ni el momento del valor. Estas prácticas deberían ser investigadas por los agentes de regulación.